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FIFTH AMENDMENT-PREVENTING AN
ABUSIVE PARENT FROM HIDING
BEHIND THE SELF-
INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110
S. Ct. 900 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, l the
United States Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination privi-
lege of the fifth amendment2 does not protect a custodian from re-
fusing to produce his or her child pursuant to a court order. This
Note explores the ramifications of the Bouknight opinion and con-
cludes that the Court correctly ruled that Ms. Bouknight could not
invoke the privilege. This Note recognizes, however, that the opin-
ion of the Court does not clearly express how attenuated
Bouknight's fifth amendment claim is compared to previous prece-
dent. Since the Court did not articulate clearly that production of
the child was not testimonial and instead relied on the definition of
a "noncriminal regulatory regime," this Note will explain how the
Court has not forestalled future claims. The Note also will focus on
the epidemic problem of child abuse in the United States and la-
ment that the Court did not use this opportunity to incorporate a
distinct balancing test, which weighs the interests of Bouknight
against those of Maurice, in the logic of its decision. Finally, this
Note concludes that by failing to stress that the rights of an abused
child may outweigh the rights of the abuser facing possible criminal
charges, the Court has failed to make a strong statement against
child abuse and thereby better protect abused children in the United
States.
1 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
2 "[N]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.". U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY: THE STORY OF MAURICE M.
A. THE INJURIES
Maurice M. was born on October 3, 1986 to Jacqueline
Bouknight.3 When he was two months old, Maurice was admitted to
Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, with chlamydia
pneumonia.4 X-rays revealed previous fractures of the right hume-
rus (upper arm), scapula (shoulder blade) and glenoid (shoulder
socket).5 On January 23, 1987, less than two months later, Maurice
was admitted to Francis Scott Key Medical Center in Baltimore, suf-
fering from a fracture of his left femur (thigh).6 This injury required
a full body cast.7 In addition, Maurice's upper right shoulder was
immobile, suggesting either a spinal cord injury or nerve damage in
the shoulder joint.8
The attending doctor at Francis Scott Key noted that it was an
uncommon occurrence for a three month old infant to have long
bone fractures and even more unusual for an infant to have multiple
fractures involving different limbs. 9 The doctor believed that these
injuries most likely resulted from severe child abuse, and feared that
if these abusive conditions were not corrected, Maurice might suffer
serious or fatal injuries. 10 During this hospitalization, parents of
another patient witnessed Bouknight violently shake Maurice and
drop him into his crib."I
B. THE CITY'S INITIAL ACTION AND EVALUATION
Prompted by several factors, including Maurice's second hospi-
talization, his prior history of injuries, his father's recent release
from prison, Bouknight's emotional problems, and her verbally abu-
s Joint Appendix to Briefs at 146, Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v.
Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (No. 88-1182) [hereinafter joint Appendix]. Like her
own child, Jacqueline Bouknight was also a Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) from
1982 through 1983. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v.
Bouknight, I10 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (No. 88-1182). A child is considered in need of assist-
ance when "[hie is mentally handicapped or is not receiving ordinary and proper care
and attention, and ... [his] parents ... are unable or unwilling to give proper care and
attention to the child and his problems." Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 913 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (quoting MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-801(e) (1984)).
4 Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 11.
5 Id. at 14.
6 Id. at 15.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 12.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 15. Maurice was in a full body cast at the time. Id.
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sive attitude toward the attending physicians and social workers, 12
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS) secured
an order from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to remove Mau-
rice from Bouknight's custody and place him in an emergency shel-
ter.'5 The court also declared Maurice a Child in Need of
Assistance (CINA).14 Notwithstanding his CINA status, on July 17,
1987, a modified shelter care order returned Maurice to his
mother's custody.' 5 This modified order required Bouknight to
"cooperate with the department, continue therapy sessions, attend
parenting classes, work on her parenting skills, and refrain from
physically punishing Maurice."' 16
OnJuly 27, 1987, a psychodiagnostic evaluation 17 revealed that
Bouknight's overall intellectual level fell within the borderline range
(I.Q.=74) of adult intellectual capacity.' 8 The tests also showed
that Bouknight lacked a genuine capacity for relating to the
thoughts and feelings of others. ' 9 The evaluating doctor concluded
that, only one week after receiving custody of Maurice, Bouknight
was not able to relate constructively to him.20 He recommended
that since Bouknight did not appear emotionally capable of provid-
ing the adult protection, nurturing, and care required for Maurice's
safety and security, she should not retain custody of her son. 21 The
doctor further suggested that Bouknight needed "intensive and ex-
tensive" therapy in an attempt to develop adequate parenting
12 In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 394, 550 A.2d 1135, 1136 (1988). Maurice's father
was serving a prison term for drug violations. Id.
13 Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 5. Ct. 900, 903 (1990).
14 By definition, a CINA is "one who does not receive ordinary and proper care and
attention and whose parents, guardians or custodians are unable or unwilling to give
proper care and attention to him and his problems." MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. § 3-801(e)
(1984).
15 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v.
Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (No. 88-1182).
16 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 903.
17 Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 22. This test was part of the BCDSS's effort to
help Bouknight learn her weaknesses so she could better care for Maurice. Dr. Joseph
Eisenberg, a psychologist, conducted the test.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 24. Dr. Eisenberg noted that Bouknight may have been so involved with
herself that she could not truly empathize and appreciate what others might experience,
think, and feel.
20 The doctor further noted that Bouknight had become totally frustrated and en-
raged to find that she had been unable to gain a replacement in Maurice for the inade-
quacies that were present in her childhood. The doctor noted that when her frustration
mounted, Bouknight would be likely to act out towards the child and see him as abusive





C. THE CITY'S FURTHER ACTION AND THE MISSING CHILD
The BCDSS again petitioned the juvenile court in Baltimore, on
April 20, 1988, to remove Maurice from Bouknight's control and
place him in foster care.23 The BCDSS petition cited Bouknight's
failure to cooperate with the department, her refusal to provide a
current address or inform the department of Maurice's wherea-
bouts, the shooting death of Maurice's father, and Bouknight's his-
tory of drug abuse.24 The petition asserted that inquiries revealed
that none of Bouknight's relatives had recently seen Maurice; it fur-
ther stated the BCDSS both prompted the police to issue a missing
persons report and referred the case to the police homicide divi-
sion.25 After Bouknight expressed fear of producing the child, the
court ordered her to show cause why she should not be held in con-
tempt for failure to bring Maurice forward in court.26
Bouknight refused to produce seven month old Maurice; in-
stead, she informed the court that he was with a relative in Dallas,
Texas.27 After the relative denied Bouknight's allegation, the court
found Bouknight in contempt for failure to produce the child as or-
dered.28 However, Bouknight could purge the contempt charge by
either producing Maurice or revealing his whereabouts. 29
Bouknight's counsel claimed that the opportunity to purge may
not be constitutional if it required the admission of a crime.30 The
juvenile court, however, rejected this claim, responding that the
contempt order was issued not because Bouknight refused to testify
in any proceeding, but because she failed to abide by the order of
the court to produce Maurice.31
The Maryland Court of Appeals vacated the juvenile court's en-
forcement of the contempt order.32 The court found that the "con-
tempt order unconstitutionally compelled Bouknight to admit
through the act of production [a] 'measure of continuing control
22 Id.
23 Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1990).
24 In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 394, 550 A.2d 1135, 1136 (1988).




29 Id. at 905.
30 Id.
31 Id. While the juvenile court's decision was being appealed, Bouknight was con-
victed of theft and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Id. at 904.
32 In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135 (1988).
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and dominion over Maurice's person in circumstances in which
Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she will be
prosecuted.' "33
Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a stay of the Maryland Court of
Appeals' decision. 34 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide whether the appellate court correctly ruled that
Bouknight's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was vi-
olated; the Supreme Court specifically reviewed that portion of the
order which proclaimed "that Bouknight could comply with the or-
der through the unadorned act of producing the child."3 5
D. POST-SCRIPT ON MAURICE
Although Bouknight has been incarcerated since April of 1988,
she has remained silent concerning Maurice.a6 Despite the
Supreme Court's ruling demanding production of the child, his
whereabouts remain unknown and the authorities continue the
search for Maurice, who would now be four years old.a7
III. BACKGROUND
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[no] person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."3 8 The First Congress proposed the
addition of this language to the Bill of Rights to ensure a privilege
against self-incrimination protected from federal government intru-
sion.3 9 This protection against self-incrimination is part of an An-
glo-American legal tradition dating back to the thirteenth century. 40
The core of the privilege against self-incrimination has not
33 Id. at 403, 550 A.2d at 1141.
34 He wrote, "There is undoubtedly a burden on Bouknight's liberty because of her
confinement, but against it must be weighed a very real jeopardy to a child's safety, well-
being, and perhaps even his life." Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight,
488 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1988).
35 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
36 Interview with Andrew Baida, Counsel for the BCDSS (Sept. 12, 1990). Baida
noted that perhaps Bouknight would rather be imprisoned for contempt than face possi-
ble criminal charges. Id.
37 Id.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39 M. BERGER, TAKING THE Frm 1 (1980) [hereinafter M. BERGER].
40 j. WAL7z &J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 345 (1980). The origin of this privilege
can be traced to the time of the Norman Conquest. At that time, a largely informal,
though accusatorial, system of criminal justice prevailed in England. M. BERGER, supra
note 39, at 3. Simultaneously, the laws of the church began to focus on an inquisitorial
mode of procedure through the adoption of the oath "ex officio," which required truthful
answers to all questions directed to the suspect. Id. at 7. The oath procedure was very
930 [Vol. 81
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changed significantly from the principle established during the his-
torical inquisitorial proceedings. 4 1 A survey of the most important
Supreme Court opinions reveals the analytical foundation for fifth
amendment decisions.
The cornerstone of fifth amendment analysis 42 is Boyd v. United
States,43 decided in 1886. In Boyd, Justice Bradley, writing for the
majority, ruled that documents belonging to the defendant were im-
mune from government seizure. Relying more on the fourth
amendment than the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, Justice Bradley stated that a sphere of privacy existed which
the government could not intrude.44 According to the Court, "the
essence of the offense... [was] the invasion of the indefeasible right
of his personal security, personal liberty, and private property. '45
Despite the opportunity, Justice Bradley's opinion did not clearly
articulate a rationale for the right against self-incrimination.
Although he stated that the "compulsory production of private
books... [was] compelling [the defendant] to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution,"46 this conclusion was intended more as an appendage to
the fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and
efficient; the inquisitor did not have an obligation to inform the suspect of either the
charges or the accusers. Id. at 4.
By the end of the seventeenth century, a substantial history of opposition to the
oath "ex officio" existed. When Puritan ministers were called before the High Commis-
sion and asked questions about their beliefs, they faced a dilemma: if they answered
truthfully, as they would being men of God, they would be punished for their deviant
views; if they lied, they would risk punishment for perjury. Therefore, the Puritans be-
gan to claim the right not to answer. See id. at 14-20.
41 Id. at 161. The most important aspect of the right to remain silent is its ability to
control state sponsored interrogations. The historical background of the privilege does
not extend much beyond official interrogations; yet, in modem American society, the
use of the privilege has expanded beyond its historical role for two reasons. First, com-
mercial and interpersonal transactions are much more complex today and require the
production of supportive documents (e.g., tax records). Second, privacy in contempo-
rary American society is in need of greater protection to ensure some amount of human
dignity due to the modem intrusive world. Id.
42 Id. at 165.
43 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the United States government brought an action for
the forfeiture of plate glass which allegedly had been imported in violation of federal
government standards. To establish its position, the government obtained a court order
requiring production of the shipper's invoice conveying the plate glass shipment. Boyd
objected because the statute authorizing the order provided that if a document was not
turned over without good excuse, then the allegations that the document would tend to
prove would be taken as confessed. Id. at 617-18.
44 Id. at 623.
45 Id. at 630.
46 Id. at 634-35.
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seizure than as a reasoned argument in itself.4 7
Although Boyd has been heralded as a "case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberties live in the United States," 48
and as "among the greatest Constitutional decisions," 49 a variety of
fifth amendment decisions have narrowed its scope. For example,
corporations are denied the protection of the self-incrimination
clause,50 as are custodians of corporate documents. 51
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Boyd doctrine in Gouled v.
United States.52 In Gouled, the Court ruled that the government could
not compel production of private documents to be used against an
individual in criminal proceedings. Like Boyd, the Court relied heav-
ily on the fourth amendment, but it also added that evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment was rendered inadmissable by
the fifth amendment because the defendant was the "unwilling
source of the evidence."153 The Court concluded that documents
should be treated like other forms of property; therefore, docu-
ments are immune from seizure only when they constitute evi-
dence.54 This conclusion significantly undercut the special privilege
afforded private papers. 55
In Shapiro v. United States,5 6 the Court further defined the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege.5 7 In Shapiro, the defendant was
suspected of illegal tie-in sales in violation of the Emergency Price
Control Act. He was issued a subpoena to produce records which
government regulations required him to keep.5 s To determine
whether the defendant could invoke his fifth amendment privilege,
47 Id. The Court did prevent the "forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's testi-
mony or his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime." Justice
Bradley, however, did not articulate the fifth amendment rationale used to arrive at this
conclusion. See id.
48 Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 776 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
50 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). In Henkel, the Court ruled that agents of
collective entities benefitted from the "special privileges and franchises" conferred by
the state but were still bound by duties to permit inspection and monitoring of docu-
ments held for the public. Id. at 57.
51 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). In Wilson, the Court relied on the
"reservation of the visitorial power of the state" to override the privilege and compel
production by the custodian of corporate documents. Id. at 385.
52 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 167.
53 Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306.
54 The Gouled opinion observed that there was "no special sanctity in papers... [if
they constituted an] agency or instrument of a crime." Id. at 309.
55 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 167.
56 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court ruled that these records were not covered by the
fifth amendment privilege.




the court sought to ascertain whether "there [was] a sufficient rela-
tion between the activity sought to be regulated and the public con-
cern so that the government [could] constitutionally regulate or
forbid the basic activity concerned." 59 The Court concluded that no
privilege existed to protect a custodian from the production of
records which the government required the custodian to keep.60
The Court shifted to a group-focus test in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board.61 In Albertson, the defendant, a member of the
Communist Party of America, failed to register with the Attorney
General as required by the order of the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board. The defendant asserted that registration would violate
his fifth amendment privilege, since association with the Communist
party presented a sufficient threat of prosecution. 62 The Albertson
Court held that the registration requirement of the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Act violated the fifth amendment. Under the
Court's group-focus rationale, production was required only if: (1)
the statute was neutral on its face; (2) the group to which the statute
was directed was not "inherently suspected of criminal activities;"
and (3) the subject was "an essentially non-criminal and regulatory
area of inquiry."6
In California v. Byers,64 the Court once again confronted the
problem of balancing the government's need to regulate conduct
and the individual's fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.65 In Byers, the defendant argued that California's "hit and
run" statute, which required a driver involved in an automobile acci-
dent causing property damage to provide his or her name and ad-
dress to the other vehicle's owner, violated the fifth amendment.
Following the Albertson test, the Byers Court found no fifth amend-
ment violation, because the statute was a generally applicable civil
regulatory scheme designed to promote the satisfaction of civil lia-
bilities, not the facilitation of criminal convictions. 66
The Court continued to refine its fifth amendment analysis in
59 Id. at 32.
60 Id.
61 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
62 Id. at 77.
63 Id. at 86. Some commentators do not regard the group-focus test as the perfect
solution but as an appropriate first step for fifth amendment protection. M. BERGER,
supra note 39, at 188.
64 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
65 Id. at 434.
66 Id. at 430. Although the Court found this act of production incriminating, the




Couch v. United States.67 In Couch, the Court ruled that the defendant
must produce her tax returns even though she had turned them
over to her accountant. 68 The Court rejected the defendant's asser-
tion that her "ownership" of the records entitled her to object to the
compulsory production of her tax records by her accountant.69 The
Court further reasoned that since the defendant had regularly
turned her records over to her accountant, she had completely
transferred possession of her documents to a third person; there-
fore, requiring the accountant to produce the tax records did not
involve personal compulsion on the part of the defendant. 70 The
majority's emphasis on possession as the basis for a claim of privi-
lege implied that even private documents might lose fifth amend-
ment protection if not in the owner's actual possession. 71
The fifth amendment privilege was further defined in Andresen v.
Maryland.72 In Adresen, a Maryland attorney was suspected of fraud,
and the government seized his real estate development files. The
Court allowed the development files to be admitted into evidence,
because the petitioner had not been asked to say or do anything,
except to produce the documents. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, argued that the fifth amendment protected privacy only
"to some extent" and had no bearing when the state did not exert
compulsion. 73 The decision in Andresen focused on a limited fifth
amendment role based on a particular form of state coercion; 74 the
fifth amendment remained a guardian against compulsory testimo-
nial communications. 75
Fisher v. United States,76 also decided in 1976, provided yet an-
67 409 U.S. 322 (1973). According to the Court, the core of the fifth amendment
prohibition was directed at "the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communi-
cations" from the accused. Id. at 328.
68 The subpoena ordered the accountant, not the defendant, to produce the defend-
ant's tax records. Id. at 325.
69 Id. "To tie the privilege against self-incrimination to a concept of ownership
would be to draw a meaningless line. Since possession bears the closest relation to the
personal compulsion forbidden by the fifth amendment, the defendant's claim is inva-
lid." Id. at 331.
70 Id. The Court recognized, however, that in certain situations, the relinquishment
of possession may be too temporary to prevent substantial compulsion. Id. at 333.
71 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 172.
72 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
73 Id. at 473.
74 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 174.
75 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 463.
76 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, the Court declared that taxpayers could not invoke
the privilege as a bar against the production of work papers prepared by their account-
ants, because the act of producing the evidence did not rise to the level of testimony
protected by the fifth amendment.
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other twist to the interpretation of the self-incrimination clause and
opened the possibility that the state could demand production of
self-incriminating documents. 77 In Fisher, several taxpayers, follow-
ing visits from Internal Revenue Service agents, secured from their
accountants various work papers relating to their tax returns; the
taxpayers then transferred these documents to their attorneys. 78
The government summoned the attorneys to produce the work pa-
pers; the attorneys refused, arguing that production would violate
the taxpayers' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.79 Justice White, writing for the majority, ruled that the taxpay-
ers' fifth amendment privilege was not violated, because the
summons was directed to a third party; therefore, no element of
compulsion existed against the taxpayers.80 Justice White further
held that compliance with the documentary summons did not in-
volve testimonial communication. He wrote:
[a] subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an ac-
countant's workpapers in his possession without doubt involves sub-
stantial compulsion. But it does not compel oral testimony, nor would
it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth
of the contents of the documents. Therefore the Fifth Amendment
would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers on their face
might incriminate the taxpayer .... 81
Following this line of reasoning, the privacy argument has not
fared particularly well in the fifth amendment arena.82 The Court
has interpreted the historical purpose of the privilege to protect
against compelled testimony; therefore, as long as the production of
the document does not require oral testimony, the privilege is not
infringed.83 The problem arises in the theory that "one who pro-
duces documents (or other matter) described in the subpoena duces
tecum represents.., that the documents produced are in fact the
documents described in the subpoena. This representation is a tes-
timonial action and [possibly should be] within the protection of
the privilege."'8 4
77 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 175.
78 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 392.
79 Id. at 391.
80 Id. at 397. Justice White wrote:
The taxpayer's privilege under this Amendment is not violated by enforcement of
the summonses involved in these cases because enforcement against a taxpayer's
lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly would not
compel him to be a 'witness' against himself.
Id.
81 Id. at 409.
82 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 178.
83 Id.
84 C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 126, at 268 (2d ed. 1972).
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IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor 5 held that Jacque-
line Bouknight could not invoke the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to circumvent the Maryland court order to
produce her child.8 6
Justice O'Connor began by noting that "the Fifth Amendment
protection 'applies only when the accused is compelled to make a
testimonial communication that is incriminating.' ",87 The majority
focused on the fact that the order to produce the child was not testi-
monial, since the order only compelled production of an item.88
While the fifth amendment may be implicated if the act of produc-
tion testifies to the existence, authenticity, or possession of things
produced, 9 it does protect against any incrimination that may result
from the contents of the thing produced. 90 The Court thus ruled
that even though complying with the government demand would
constitute testimony as to the existence of Maurice, Bouknight could
not use the privilege to protect herself from any incrimination that
may result from an examination of Maurice. 9'
The majority conceded that, despite the state's ability to intro-
duce evidence of Bouknight's control of Maurice, her act of produc-
tion would amount to an implicit communication of control, which
might aid the state's prosecution. Justice O'Connor countered,
however, that the limited testimonial assertion in Bouknight's pro-
duction was insufficient to recognize the fifth amendment privilege.
O'Connor further stated that even if "this limited testimonial asser-
tion [was] sufficiently incriminating and 'sufficiently testimonial for
purposes of the privilege,' "92 Bouknight "may not invoke the privi-
lege to resist the production order because she [had] assumed cus-
todial duties related to production and because production [was]
required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime." 93
Justice O'Connor first focused on the implications of the defini-
tion of a "regulatory regime." Relying on past decisions, Justice
85 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy joined in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion.
86 Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990).
87 Id. at 904 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (emphasis added)).
88 Id. at 905 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
89 Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988)).
90 Id. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
91 Id.




O'Connor stated that the fifth amendment could not be used to re-
sist compliance with a regulation "constructed to effect the State's
public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal
laws." 94 The Court then cited Shapiro v. United States for the proposi-
tion that the fifth amendment does not attach to the production of
required records kept for the benefit of the public and open for public
inspection.95 Although the Shapiro Court stated that the Constitu-
tion limits the government's ability to require recordkeeping which
later may be used by the government against the recordkeeper,96
Justice O'Connor noted that these limits have been modified. The
government may access information vested with public character in
"essentially non-criminal and regulatory areas of inquiry; ' 9 7 how-
ever, access to records via Shapiro is limited when the order for pro-
duction is directed at a "selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities." 98
To further clarify the distinction between the production of
records and information pursuant to a "non-criminal regulatory
scheme" and statutory schemes focusing on criminal activities, Jus-
tice O'Connor cited California v. Byers.99 Based on Shapiro and Byers,
the majority concluded that the "ability to invoke the pfivilege may
be greatly diminished when invocation would interfere with the ef-
fective operation of a generally applicable civil regulatory
requirement."100
Justice O'Connor then addressed the fifth amendment implica-
tions of being a recordkeeping custodian in a civil regulatory
scheme. She noted that "[w]hen a person assumes control over
items that are the legitimate object of the government's non-crimi-
94 Id.
95 Id. (citing Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 17-18).
96 It may be assumed at the outset that there are limits which the Government
cannot constitutionally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be
inspected by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory
violations committed by the recordkeeper himself.
Id. (quoting Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 32).
These constitutional limits were not infringed in Shapiro, because "there [was] a
sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern so
that the Government [could] constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic activity con-
cerned." Id.
97 Id. (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968)). Marchetti in turn
quoted Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
98 Id. (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57). See also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62, 68 (1968) (defendant was prosecuted for willful failure to pay excise tax imposed on
wagering by federal law; Shapiro was not applicable because "the statutory obligations
[were] directed almost exclusively to individuals inherently suspect of criminal
activities").
99 402 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of Byers, see supra notes 64-66.
100 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 906.
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nal regulatory powers, the ability to invoke the privilege is re-
duced."'' 1 When these conditions are satisfied, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the "custodian has no privilege to refuse production
although [the record's] contents [may] tend to incriminate him. In
assuming their custody, [the custodian] has accepted the incident
obligation to permit inspection."' 10 2
Applying these principles, the majority declared that the intent
of the court order was to compel the production of Maurice, not to
prosecute Bouknight criminally; therefore, Bouknight could not in-
voke her fifth amendment privilege.'0 3 To substantiate this conclu-
sion, Justice O'Connor began by reviewing the regulatory aspects of
the case. Justice O'Connor also declared that since Bouknight had
assumed custody of Maurice, she was subject to the regulations of a
custodian. 0 4
Justice O'Connor stated that Maurice was the particular object
of the State's regulatory interest, 10 5 because he had been adjudi-
cated a Child in Need of Assistance. Maryland had "entrusted re-
sponsibility for Maurice's care to Bouknight."' 10 6 Thus, "by
accepting care of Maurice subject to the custodial order's conditions
... Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory
system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the
State's regulatory interest and subject to inspection by the
BCDSS."' 10 7 Moreover, by "assuming the obligations attending cus-
tody, Bouknight '[had] accepted the incident obligation to permit
inspection.' "108
The majority then stated that Bouknight's obligations were de-
rived from a "broadly directed, noncriminal regulatory regime gov-
erning children cared for pursuant to custodial orders."' 0 9 Justice
O'Connor further concluded that the request for the production of
Maurice was pursuant to a noncriminal regulation directed at a
group that was not "'inherently suspect of criminal activities.' "110
101 Id.
102 Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911)). Justice O'Connor
also cited to Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109-13 (1988), and Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1957).
103 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct at 906.
104 Id. at 907. "These included requirements that Bouknight cooperate with the





108 Id. (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911)).
109 Id. (citing MD. CTS. OFJUD. PROC. § 3-820(b) (1984)).
110 Id. at 908 (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57). Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
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Yet, Justice O'Connor also argued that "[e]ven when criminal con-
duct may exist, the court [may] properly require production and re-
turn of the child, and enforce that request through the exercise of its
contempt power, for reasons related entirely to the child's well-be-
ing and through measures unrelated to criminal law enforcement or
investigations." 1
Nor could the order to produce Maurice be characterized as an
effort to gain some testimonial component from the act of produc-
tion. 112 The majority concluded that concern for Maurice's protec-
tion was the focal point of the protective order and that the demand
for production of Maurice was unrelated to criminal law enforce-
ment."13 Therefore, Bouknight could not invoke her fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination to avoid complying with the
court order.
Finally, the majority stated that while the Court was "not called
upon to define the precise limitations that [might] exist upon the
State's ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of
production in subsequent criminal proceedings," ' 1 4 the custodial
role that limited Bouknight's resistance to the production order
might likewise limit the use of any "testimony" in future criminal
prosecution. 115 The majority succinctly concluded that:
these orders to produce children cannot be characterized as efforts to
gain some testimonial component of the act of production. The gov-
ernment demands production of the very public charge entrusted to a
custodian and makes this demand for compelling reasons unrelated to
criminal law enforcement and as part of a broadly applied regulatory
regime. In these circumstances, Bouknight cannot invoke the privi-
lege to resist the order to produce Maurice. 16
provision that authorized the juvenile court's efforts to gain production of Maurice had
the same broad applicability as other provisions governing juvenile custody orders,
which focus not on the parent as a criminal, but on the parent's ability to provide for his
or her child. Id. She further concluded that "BCDSS's efforts to gain access to children,
as well as judicial efforts to the same, do not 'focus almost exclusively on conduct which
was criminal.' Many orders will arise in circumstances entirely devoid of criminal con-
duct." Id. (citation omitted).
I Id. Justice O'Connor believed that this case satisfied these standards; she wrote,
"[t]his case provides an illustration: concern for the child's safety underlay the efforts to
gain access to and then compel production of Maurice." Id.
112 Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that even if a particular act of production would








B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing the dissent, Justice Marshall' 17 protested that neither
the nontestimonial aspects of production nor the regulatory scheme
analysis articulated by the majority satisfactorily supported the hold-
ing that Bouknight could not invoke the fifth amendment privilege
to resist production of Maurice.1 18 Justice Marshall stated that he
"would not hesitate to hold explicitly that Bouknight's admission of
control presented a 'real and appreciable threat of self incrimina-
tion.' "119 Specifically, he argued that production in this case would
be testimonial and that Bouknight did not fall within the definition
of custodian. 120 According to Justice Marshall, the production of
Maurice would be testimonial, because it would establish
Bouknight's control over him and "thus might prove a significant
'link in a chain of evidence' tending to establish her guilt.' 12 1
Justice Marshall was baffled by the majority's analogy of
Bouknight's obligation to those of a custodian of records. 122 He
contended that "a finding that a child [was] in need of assistance
does not by itself divest a parent of legal or physical custody."' 123
When custody was returned to Bouknight, it was returned to her as
the child's parent, not because the state delegated that responsibil-
ity to her out of its own interest. Justice Marshall emphasized that
Bouknight was not the agent for an artificial entity. 124 She was an
individual acting in a personal capacity, rather than acting on behalf
of the state.125
The dissent further argued that the custodial rights and obliga-
117 Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in the dissent.
118 Id. at 909 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48
(1968)). In Marchetti, the Court held that the fifth amendment was a valid defense in a
prosecution for failure to register to pay the occupation tax under the federal wagering
tax statutes. If the defendant had complied with the statute, he would have indicated
that future illegal acts may take place, thereby incriminating himself. 390 U.S. at 49.
120 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 909 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 909 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 48). Justice Mar-
shall asserted that Bouknight faced a real threat of criminal charges, including child
abuse and possibly murder. Id. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that this characterization
contradicted the facts of the case and that the Court had never relied on this type of
characterization to override the fifth amendment privilege except in the context of a
claim of privilege by an agent of a collective entity. Id.
123 Id. (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall discussed that under the statute that
declared Maurice a CINA, Bouknight did not act as a custodian on behalf of the state;
rather, she continued to exercise parental custody with additional obligations imposed
upon her by the state.
124 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tions placed on Bouknight were not the same obligations as those
faced by a corporate agent. 126 Unlike a natural person, a custodian
of corporate rights represented a "collective entity" and therefore
had no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 127 Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that he was "unwilling to extend the collec-
tive entity doctrine into a context where it [denied] individuals,
acting in their personal rather than representative capacities, their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."' 128
Justice Marshall then attacked the majority's analysis and appli-
cation of the civil regulatory regime to deny Bouknight fifth amend-
ment protection.' 29  The dissent argued that the Court's
"characterization of Maryland's system is dubious and highlights the
flaws inherent in the Court's formulation of the appropriate Fifth
Amendment inquiry."'130 The dissent claimed that "[v]irtually any
civil regulatory scheme could be characterized as essentially non-
criminal by looking narrowly at it."'13 1 Instead, Justice Marshall ad-
vocated looking at the practical effects of the statute, since the regu-
lations embodied in the juvenile welfare statutes were intimately
related to the enforcement of criminal statutes prohibiting child
abuse.' 32 He argued that it was difficult to separate the two inter-
ests, since the state's goal of protecting children from an abusive
environment targets conduct that is subject to criminal sanction.' 33
Therefore, Justice Marshall argued that the "Court's test [would]
never be used to find a relationship between the civil scheme and
law enforcement goals significant enough to implicate the Fifth
Amendment."' 134 He declared that "[a] civil scheme that inevitably
intersects with criminal sanctions may not be used to coerce a po-
tential criminal defendant to furnish evidence crucial to the success
126 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall relied on the collective entity doc-
trine articulated in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). In White, the Court held
that a labor union did not have a fifth amendment privilege, because when individuals
act as representatives of a collective group, they "cannot be said to be exercising their
personal rights and duties not to be entitled to their purely personal privileges."
Bouhnight, 110 S. Ct. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 699).
128 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 912 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall pointed out that the regula-
tions cited by the majority had two common features that were erroneously applied to
the facts of Bouknight's case. First, they concerned civil regulations that were not pri-
marily intended to facilitate criminal investigations. Second, they targeted the general
public.
130 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of her own prosecution."'1 5
Finally, Justice Marshall advocated an analytical approach that
would "target the respondent's particular claim of privilege, the
precise nature of the testimony sought and the likelihood of self-
incrimination caused by this respondent's compliance."' 3 6 The
privilege would then revolve around the concrete facts of each case,
rather than around abstract notions concerning the nature of a reg-
ulatory scheme. 137
Justice Marshall argued that when the state demands testimony
from its citizen, it should do so under a grant of immunity. 3 8 Jus-
tice Marshall further attacked the majority's assertion that Mary-
land's juvenile welfare scheme is "broadly directed,"' 39 contending
instead that it was actually narrowly targeted at parents who have
abused or neglected their children to the point that the state must
lend assistance. 140 Justice Marshall proffered that these parents are
a " 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' "141
Justice Marshall concluded that the majority rode roughshod
over Bouknight's privilege against self-incrimination, because she
was neither a traditional "custodian" nor a state agent.' 42 More im-
portant, the regulatory scheme was too closely intertwined with
criminal statutes prohibiting child abuse to define it as a civil regula-
tory scheme. 143 Though Justice Marshall was encouraged that the
court admitted that Bouknight's testimony might be in-
admissable, 144 he emphasized, "I am not content to deny her the
constitutional protection required by the Fifth Amendment now in
the hope that she will not be convicted later on the basis of her own
testimony."1 45
135 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
136 Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To sustain the privilege under Justice Mar-
shall's analysis, "it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it was asked, that a responsive answer to the question . . . might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
137 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 907.
140 Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).
142 Id. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).




A. INTRODUCTION: HAS JUSTICE PREVAILED?
This case exemplifies Justice William O'Douglas' concern that
"[a]s an original matter it might be debatable whether the provision
of the Fifth Amendment that no person 'shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself' serves the ends ofjus-
tice."' 46 The Court correctly decided Bouknight, because it did not
allow Bouknight to manipulate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion provided in the fifth amendment. A decision in Bouknight's
favor would have corrupted the purpose of the amendment, since
the privilege was intended to be a "shield against inquisitorial and
unfair government practice, [not a] sword to carve a path through
the laws of the land."'47
First, the Court's reasoning properly focused on the testimonial
aspects of producing Maurice and the noncriminal nature of the reg-
ulatory scheme of the juvenile welfare system. The Court arrived at
this logical conclusion by analyzing and applying the two require-
ments needed for fifth amendment protection. Following the prece-
dent that " [t]he Fifth Amendment protection 'applies only when the
accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is in-
criminating,' "148 the Court concluded that Bouknight could not
claim the privilege based upon anything that examination of Mau-
rice might reveal.' 49
Second, the Court discussed at length the fact that Bouknight
may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order, because
she had assumed custodial duties related to production, and be-
146 L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FiFrH AMENDMENT vii (1959). It should be
noted that a survey of existing case law reveals no dear guidance to determine how a
particular statute will be categorized---e., as part of a generally applicable civil regula-
tory scheme, or as part of a regulatory scheme established to enforce criminal laws. The
Court has failed to delineate the relevant factors for analyzing regulatory obligations
that are potentially self-incriminating, thereby creating the risk that "the scope of the
Fifth Amendment protection will now depend on what a majority of nine justices
chooses to place on this explicit constitutional guarantee as opposed to the government
interest in convincing a [person] by compelling self-incriminating testimony." Califor-
nia v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 463 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
147 United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In Flores, the
court rejected a fifth amendment challenge to a Federal Gun Control Act requirement
that a person shipping firearms must give notice to the carrier. Since the legislation was
enacted for the purpose of protecting citizens, and not for prosecutorial ends, the de-
fendant's claim was not within the scope of the privilege. Id.
148 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408
(1976)).
149 Id. at 905.
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cause production was part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.' 50
The Court correctly relied upon previous case law, which recog-
nized that the fifth amendment privilege cannot be used to resist
compliance with a regulation that is construed to "effect the State's
public purpose unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal
laws."' 5' In concluding that the purpose of the court order to pro-
duce Maurice was part of a noncriminal regulatory scheme,
Bouknight was precluded from invoking the privilege.
However, in order to create a stronger opinion, the Court could
have more clearly articulated three points. First, the Court should
have concluded that the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's produc-
tion of Maurice were too slight to be relevant. Second, the Court
might have focused more stringently on the production of Maurice
to show the noncriminal goal of the regulatory scheme. Finally, a
more persuasive opinion would have explained in greater detail the
balancing process relied on by the majority to reach its decision.
Weighing the interests of Bouknight against the interests of Maurice
is inherent in this case; the Court should have focused on this bal-
ancing process to emphasize the limited scope of Bouknight's fifth
amendment rights and the importance of the rights of Maurice.
B. THE ISSUE OF TESTIMONIAL PRODUCTION
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ap-
plies only if the accused is compelled to make a testimonial commu-
nication that may be incriminating. 152 The Court grappled with
deciding whether Bouknight's compliance with the court order
would testify to the existence, possession, or authenticity of the
thing produced.'15 Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly answer
this question; instead, it vacillated on the possibility that the produc-
tion may be "sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privi-
lege."'154 Ultimately, the Court sidestepped the issue entirely by
asserting that the distinction was irrelevant, because Bouknight had
assumed custodial duties in a noncriminal regulatory regime. 155
The Court failed to make a definitive statement on the issue of testi-
monial communication; this failure could have been avoided by fo-
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 904.
153 Id. at 905. See United States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201, 209 (1988).




cusing on Supreme Court precedent.15 6
First, the privilege against self-incrimination does not shield in-
dividuals from compulsory disclosure of incriminating information;
it merely shields individuals when the state compels testimony.
Here, the state was not requiring Bouknight to "utter a sound."15 7
The Court literally interpreted the privilege to protect the accused
only from being compelled to testify against herself.158 The major-
ity ruled that when the government demands that an item be pro-
duced, "the only thing compelled is the act of producing the
[item]."' 1 9 Following this reasoning, Bouknight could have purged
her contempt via several silent methods without compromising her
privilege. An anonymous phone call to police, a confidential in-
struction to her attorney, or a call to the child's caretaker could have
led to Maurice's discovery without an incriminating statement or act
by his mother.' 60 None of these methods would have constituted a
testimonial statement by Bouknight concerning Maurice. By pro-
ducing Maurice in this manner, Bouknight would have complied
with the court order without admitting guilt.
Second, Maurice was real evidence, not testimonial or commu-
nicative evidence. Real or physical items which do not convey the
thoughts of an individual are not protected under the fifth amend-
ment.16 Production of Maurice would not have revealed any infor-
mation concerning Bouknight that the Court did not already know;
the only information that production would have revealed was that
Maurice was alive.' 62
These two arguments alone could have supported a stronger
assertion that production of Maurice did not involve any testimonial
implications. In addition, comparing the facts of the instant case to
the facts of prior precedents, the Court's decision to deny
156 See, e.g., Doe, 487 U.S. at 201; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391; Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966).
157 In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 404, 550 A. 2d 1136, 1142 (1988).
158 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905.
159 Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
160 Brief on the Merits of Petitioner Maurice M. at 14, Baltimore City Dep't of Social
Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (Nos. 88-1182, 88-6651).
161 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
162 Some feared that Bouknight's rights would be trammeled if the production of
Maurice revealed severe abuse or his death, and that based on these revelations
Bouknight would be criminally prosecuted for these crime. This fear, however, is not
within the scope of the fifth amendment protection, as the privilege does not protect an
individual from any incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the
thing demanded. Therefore, if Maurice had been severely abused or killed, a cursory
examination of the child would reveal this fact, and the privilege does not extend to facts
that can be ascertained without Bouknight's intervention.
1991] 945
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Bouknight her fifth amendment privilege could have been strength-
ened by showing that the purpose and focus of production was not
Bouknight, but Maurice.
The Court relied on decisions where a "suspect" was com-
pelled to furnish inanimate objects as evidence against his or her
case. For example, in Schmerber v. California, the Court demanded
that the accused furnish a blood sample after an automobile acci-
dent to determine whether the accused was intoxicated. 163 In Doe v.
United States, the Court compelled the suspect to execute a consent
form authorizing the release of bank records necessary to establish
his fraud. 64 In these two cases, the Court demanded the produc-
tion of an item that necessarily would be used against the individual.
In fact, the reason for compulsion was to aid in establishing proof
for the case against the suspect.
The Court's reliance on these two cases was not completely
sound, because Bouknight was not a criminal suspect in the same
sense as a drunken driver or a tax evader. The Court did not want
her to produce Maurice to aid them in establishing testimony for a
criminal case against her. Instead, the Court's only goal was to
guarantee Maurice's safety.
The Court correctly focused on the noncriminal aspects of the
court order but failed to emphasize the fundamental differences be-
tween the compelled productions in Schmerber and Doe and the com-
pelled production of Maurice. The production of Maurice was an
end in itself, not a contrived step to further prosecution. The Court
already knew that Bouknight exercised control over Maurice due to
the custody order, testimony of relatives and her own admissions; 65
thus, the sole reason for this production order was to guarantee the
safety of Maurice. Accordingly, the majority failed to fully explore
the differences between compelling production of Maurice and com-
pelling production of "incriminating documents."
The Court did not comment on the possibility of further prose-
cution, except to say that it was not the Court's responsibility "to
define the precise limitations that may exist upon the State's ability
to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of production in
subsequent criminal proceedings."'166 The opinion hinted at the
163 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
164 487 U.S. 201 (1988). In Doe, a court order compelled the defendant to execute
consent forms authorizing foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts. The Court
ruled that the privilege was not implicated, because the defendant was not required to
disclose any knowledge he may have had regarding the documents. Id.
165 Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900, 905 (1990).
166 Id. at 908.
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possibility that Bouknight may be protected because the "same cus-
todial role that limited the ability to resist the production order may
give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and indirect
use of that testimony."'167
C. THE INTERESTS OF MAURICE VERSUS THE INTERESTS OF
BOUKNIGHT
The Court should have directly addressed the tension between
the possibility of self-incrimination and the safety of the child. First,
the Court recognized that at its best, Bouknight's claim was at the
outer fringe of the constitutional guarantee. Second, the Court de-
clared the government's purpose to be plainly nonprosecutorial.' 68
After accepting these two facts, the Court should have focused on
the state's strong interest in protecting an abused child. Instead,
the Court exhaustively dissected the meaning of a "noncriminal reg-
ulatory regime." While the Court may have properly grounded its
decision in the language of prior cases, it should have expanded the
previously established parameters to create a stronger opinion. A
more complete articulation of the balancing process employed by
the Court in deciding between the state's regulatory interest and
Bouknight's claim to constitutional protection would have produced
such an opinion.
For example, the majority should have applied the balancing
approach articulated in California v. Byers 169 to the facts of this case.
In Byers, the Court resolved the tension between the state's need for
information and the individual's right against self-incrimination by
balancing these two interests. The Byers Court, after determining
that the request for production occurred pursuant to a generally ap-
plicable civil regulatory scheme, balanced the degree of incrimina-
tion produced through compliance with the statute against the
state's regulatory interests. The Court found that an insubstantial
amount of incrimination existed 70 but that important state interests
remained. The Byers Court therefore concluded that compliance
with the "hit and run" statute did not violate the fifth
amendment. 171
By subjecting the facts of Bouknight to the Byers balancing ap-
167 Id.
168 Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 907.
169 See supra notes 64-66 for further discussion of the Byers decision.
170 The Court concluded first that producing one's name and address was a neutral
act, California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 432 (1971), and second, that stopping one's car




proach, the tenuous nature of Bouknight's claim is glaringly appar-
ent. The public purpose of the statute in Byers was to facilitate the
assessment of civil liabilities in traffic accidents. In Bouknight, the
purpose of the production order was to protect the life of an abused
child.
Additionally, the production order was not directed at a group
"inherently suspect of criminal activities." 172 Instead, it imple-
mented the statutory requirement that a parent, guardian or custo-
dian must, on pain of contempt, bring a child before the court when
requested. 173 The vast majority of cases in which a state requires
production of a child do not involve suspicion of criminal activity; in
fact, "although the state may suspect that the child has been ne-
glected or abused, in only a small minority of the cases did it suspect
that such neglect or abuse had been so severe as to trigger criminal
liability, [studies show] less than ten percent of all child abuse cases
go forward to prosecution." 174
The dissent's concern that Bouknight may be subject to crimi-
nal liability is immaterial. Just as the reporting requirement in Byers
will be imposed on some persons who may later face criminal liabil-
ity, court orders requiring production of children will also be im-
posed on some parents who subsequently may be charged with child
abuse. But, the "risk of prosecution" is not the issue where
mandatory disclosures are requested to serve an important societal
interest. The question is whether the "hazards of self-incrimina-
tion" were substantial. 175 In this case, the facts indicate that the
hazards were not sufficiently substantial.
In accord with this standard, the majority could have stressed
that although it is possible that the state will act upon physical evi-
dence disclosed by the compelled production of Maurice and may
even prosecute Bouknight for child abuse, "it cannot rationally be
suggested that the motive ... in seeking a court order for the pro-
duction of Maurice was to gain evidence in a criminal prosecu-
tion." 176 The only purpose was to protect an abused child. By
focusing on this balancing approach and comparing the facts of By-
172 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430.
173 See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-814(c) (1984).
174 Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors et al. at 13, Baltimore City Dep't
of Social Services v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (Nos. 88-1182 & 88-6651) (quot-
ing Whitcomb, Shapiro & Stellwager, When the Victim is a Child Issues forJudges and Prose-
cutors i (Nat'l Inst. ofJust. 1985)).
175 Byers, 402 U.S. at 429.




ers to Bouknight, the Court could have presented a much more coher-
ent, concise, and forceful opinion.
The Court should have looked to the framers' intent for the
fifth amendment, which was to weigh and compare the state's and
the individual's interests.1 77 The framers' intent gives content to
the language of the fifth amendment and determines the conse-
quences of its application.17  When the Court faces this issue again,
it should carefully balance the competing interests of the parties in-
volved to safeguard the fundamental values inherent in the privilege
against self-incrimination.
D. CHILD ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
The balancing of interests, approach logically indicates the im-
portance of the rights of Maurice. This analysis is important be-
cause it is difficult to dissect reason from emotion when discussing
this case, since the plight of child abuse has reached epidemic pro-
portions in the United States. 179 The Court did analyze the reach of
the fifth amendment logically and in accord with precedent. But the
majority could have used this case as an opportunity to stress the
importance of protecting children from child abuse. The Court has
long recognized the State's paramount "parens patriae" interest in
the welfare of children. In Prince v. Massachusetts,10 the Court,
stated, "[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole commu-
177 M. BERGER, supra note 39, at 225 (1980).
178 Id.
179 Reports of child abuse and neglect have soared, reaching an estimated 1.5 million
reports nationwide against famiies in 1986, an increase of 66% from 1980. Among
children less than one year old, homicide (often representing lethal cases of child abuse)
is the leading cause of injury related deaths. In that same year (1986), 20 states, repre-
senting 50% of the nation's child population, reported that 556 children died as the
result of child abuse or neglect. In 76.4% of the deaths, the perpetrator was the parent,
step-parent, or foster-parent. Though these figures are daunting, they are undoubtedly
an underestimate of the actual number of abuse and fatalities since they are only the
cases which came to the public attention through an official report of child abuse or
neglect. Studies show that only one-third of actual child abuse known to officials are
officially reported, and the number of unreported abuse cases are even higher. See
AMERICAN HuMANE ASSN., HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORT-
ING--1986 (1988); R. GELLES & M. STRAUSS, IrrIMATE VIOLENCE: THE DEFINITIVE STUDY
OF CASES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988); UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HumAN SERVICES, STUDY OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVA-
LENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT-, 1988 (1988); Waller, Baker & Szocka, Childhood
Injury Deaths: National Analysis and Geographic Variations, 79 AMER. J. PUB. HaLTH 310,
314 (1989).
180 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the child's custodian was convicted under a provi-
sion of the state's child labor laws which prohibited a custodian from allowing children
to sell newspapers on the street. The Court concluded that the state may limit parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare. Id. at 165.
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nity, that children be both safeguarded from abuse and given oppor-
tunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men,
[women] and citizens."'' A similar comment certainly would have
been permissible here. In Prince, the child was in no apparent dan-
ger of physical harm, whereas Maurice is known to have suffered
extreme physical abuse and is most likely in great danger of further
harm.
Recently, this Court issued a strong social commentary when
the safety of a child was at stake.' 8 2 In Jehovah's Witnesses v. King
County Hospital, the Court reaffirmed the right of the state to inter-
vene to protect children when their health or safety is threatened.
There is no dispute that protection of children is a compelling state
interest. Not unexpectedly, many courts have asserted that the
child's interest outweigh the interests of an abusive parent.' 83
In People v. Salinas, the California Appellate Court balanced the
interests of the child's well-being in an emergency situation where
the child's life was at stake against the need to protect the alleged
abuser's right against self-incrimination. The Salinas court held that
"there [was] no question that the former interest outweighs the lat-
ter, any other policy would reflect an indifference to human life."' 184
Since Maurice is still missing, it is impossible to know for certain if
his life is at stake, but it is certain that the situation was one of emer-
gency proportions and one of critical government interest.
Since child abuse in the United States has reached epidemic
proportions, 8 5 the court should have focused more closely on Mau-
rice's rights. The state's interest in protecting the health and safety
of the millions of children like Maurice is unquestionable. These
children are at the mercy of both their abusive parents and the court
system; therefore, the Court should have made a strong statement
to help protect children from being victimized by parents unjustly
hiding behind the self-incrimination privilege offered by the fifth
amendment.
181 Id.
182 Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968). The Court de-
clared that Jehovah's Witness parents did not have the power to object to the adminis-
tration of blood transfusions to their children who needed such treatment for their
physical safety. Id. at 598.
183 See, e.g., People v. Salinas, 131 Cal. App. 3d 925, 182 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1982). In
Salinas, the Court ruled that the mother was not able to sustain a fifth amendment privi-
lege claim, because the allegedly incriminating information she held was needed to pro-
vide necessary care for her child. Id. at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
184 Id. at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 692.




This case is particularly disturbing, because even though the
Court has declared that Bouknight must obey the production order,
Maurice is still missing. Rather than produce him, she has chosen to
remain in contempt of court and complete her jail sentence.18 6 The
Court reached the correct decision; the majority's reasoning prop-
erly focused on the nontestimonial aspects of producing Maurice
and the noncriminal nature of the regulatory scheme of the juvenile
welfare system. By literally interpreting the requirement that the
fifth amendment protection only applied to incriminating testimo-
nial communication, the Court precluded Bouknight from hiding
behind the privilege.
However, the Court could have more strongly asserted that in
no way was production of Maurice a testimonial communication. It
also could have more clearly articulated the balancing test to show
that the state's interest in protecting Maurice outweighed any atten-
uated fifth amendment claim. A stronger statement most likely
would not have changed the present status of both Maurice andJac-
queline Bouknight. But, the Court could have used this opportunity
to articulate clearly the reasoning behind the balancing inherent in
their decision. By making a more powerful statement on the impor-
tance of the rights of abused children in the United States and the
Court's hard-line adherence to a limited fifth amendment privilege,
perhaps the Court could have prevented future cases like this, where
there are no victors, only victims.
ELIZABETH J. RUFFING
186 Interview with Andrew Baida, Counsel for the BCDSS (Sept. 12, 1990).
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